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M
acroeconomic models that are applied to the study of monetary
policy often exhibit multiple equilibria.1 Prior to the mid-1990s,
applied monetary theory typically modeled monetary policy in
terms of a rule for the money supply, and it was well understood that multi-
ple equilibria often arose under constant money supply policies. Starting in
the mid-1990s, applied work shifted to modeling monetary policy in terms
of interest rate rules. This was mainly because of the accumulating obser-
vations that central banks in fact operated with interest rate targets rather
than money supply targets. A particular class of interest rate rules—so called
“active Taylor rules,” featuring a strong response of the policy interest rate
to inﬂation—attracted special attention. In linearized models these policy
rules were shown to guarantee a locally unique nonexplosive equilibrium.
Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe looked beyond the local dynamics in a
series of articles (e.g., 2001a, 2001b, 2002), and showed that active Taylor
rules could in fact lead to multiple equilibria. Whereas local analysis ignored
the zero bound on nominal interest rates, global analysis showed that the zero
bound implied the existence of a second steady-state equilibrium, with low
inﬂationandalownominalinterestrate. Thissecondsteadystateprovedtobe
the “destination” for paths that had appeared explosive in the local analysis.
Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe’s results attracted much attention in the
academic literature because the prevailing wisdom had held that activeTaylor
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rules generated a unique equilibrium. More recently, the persistence of low
inﬂation and low nominal interest rates has brought attention to Benhabib,
Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe’s work in policy circles. Most notably, Bullard
(2010) argued that monetary policy in the United States could unintentionally
be leading the economy to a steady state in which inﬂation is below its target.
This article provides an introduction to Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and
Uribe’sworkonmultipleequilibriaunderactiveTaylorrules,usingtwosimple
models. While the type of results presented here is not new, the speciﬁc
modeling framework—Rotemberg price setting in discrete time—is new, and
it ﬁts neatly into the frameworks typically used for applied monetary policy




shows the existence of multiple equilibria in a reduced-form model consisting
only of an active Taylor rule and a Fisher equation, assuming that the real
interest rate is exogenous and ﬁxed. Section 3 describes the discrete-time
Rotemberg pricing model to be used in the remainder of the article. Steady-
state equilibria and local dynamics are described in Section 4, and global
dynamics are described in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Multiple equilibria is a common theme in monetary economics, and has been
at least since the work of Brock (1975). On the theory side, there has been a
steady stream of work on multiple equilibria since the 1970s. In contrast, em-
phasisonmultipleequilibriainappliedmonetarypolicyresearchhasﬂuctuated
as new theoretical results have appeared, the tools of analysis have evolved,
and economic circumstances have changed. The immediate explanation for
why the theoretical results described in this article have attracted attention in
policycircles—10yearsafterthoseresultsﬁrstappeared—involveseconomic
circumstances, namely the existence of low inﬂation and near-zero nominal
interest rates in the United States. There is a longer history, however, that
also involves the ascent of interest rate feedback rules and linearized New
Keynesian models, and the accompanying focus on active Taylor rules as a
descriptive and prescriptive guide to central bank behavior.
Beginning with Bernanke and Blinder (1992), quantitative research on
monetary policy in the United States rapidly shifted from modeling mone-
tary policy as controlling the money supply to modeling monetary policy as
controllinginterestrates.2 Ataroundthesametime,HendersonandMcKibbin
2 Bernanke and Blinder were not the ﬁrst to suggest modeling monetary policy in terms of
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(1993) and Taylor (1993) inﬂuentially proposed particular rules for the con-
duct of monetary policy. These rules involved the policy rate (federal funds
rate in the United States) being set as a linear function of a small number
of endogenous variables, typically including inﬂation and some measure of
real activity. Henderson and McKibbin focused on the normative aspects of
interestraterules, whereasTayloralsoarguedthatwhatwouldbecomeknown
as the “Taylor rule” actually provided a reasonable description of short-term
interest rates in the United States from 1986–1992.
JustasTaylorruleswereattractingmoreattention,anothershiftwasoccur-
ring in the nature of quantitative research on monetary policy. Bernanke and
Blinder’s 1992 article had used vector autoregressions (VARs) for its empiri-
cal analysis and, in their policy analysis, Henderson and McKibbin employed
linear rational expectations models with some rule-of-thumb behavior. These
twoapproaches—VARsandlinearrationalexpectationsmodels—hadbecome
standard in applied monetary economics for empirical analysis and policy
analysis, respectively. Beginning withYun (1996), King andWolman (1996),
and Woodford (1997), however, the tide shifted toward what Goodfriend and
King (1997) called New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) models. NNS models
represented a melding of real business cycle (RBC) methodology—dynamic
general equilibrium—with nominal rigidities and other market imperfections.
Nominal rigidities made the NNS models appealing frameworks for studying
monetary policy, and the RBC methodology meant that it was straightforward
to model the behavior of monetary policy as following a Taylor-style rule.
WhileNNSmodels,likeRBCmodels,werefundamentallynonlinear,they
were typically studied using linear approximation. In linearized NNS mod-
els (as with their predecessors, the linear rational expectations models), the
question of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium generally was presumed
to be identical to the question of whether the model possessed unique stable
local dynamics in the neighborhood of the steady state around which one lin-
earized.3 In turn, the nature of the local dynamics depended on the properties
of the interest rate rule. Although speciﬁc conditions can vary across models,
the results in Leeper (1991) and Kerr and King (1996) were the basis for a
usefulruleofthumbinmanymonetarymodels: Taylor-styleinterestraterules
were consistent with unique stable local dynamics only if the coefﬁcient on
inﬂation was greater than one; a coefﬁcient less than one would be consistent
with a multiplicity of stable local dynamics. Taylor rules with a coefﬁcient
greater than one became known as active Taylor rules, and the rule of thumb
3 For example, see Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or King and Watson (1998). In many eco-
nomic models, explosive paths for some variables are inconsistent with equilibrium. For example,
explosive paths for the capital stock can be inconsistent with a transversality condition (in non-
technical terms, consumers would be leaving money on the table), and explosive paths for real
money balances can violate the requirement of a nonnegative price level. See Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1983) for a discussion of these issues.320 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
that activeTaylor rules guaranteed a unique equilibrium became known as the
Taylor principle.4 Passive Taylor rules, in contrast, are Taylor rules with a
coefﬁcient on inﬂation less than one.
Some intuition for theTaylor principle comes from the much earlier work
of Sargent and Wallace (1975) and McCallum (1981). Sargent and Wallace
showed that if the nominal interest rate is held ﬁxed by the central bank,
then in many models expectations of future inﬂation will be pinned down,
but the current price level is left indeterminate. McCallum followed up by
showing that if the nominal interest rate responds to some nominal variable it
is also possible to pin down the price level. The Taylor principle states that
multiplicity can occur if the nominal interest rate does not respond strongly
enough to inﬂation, consistent with the message of Sargent and Wallace and
McCallum.
With widespread understanding of the Taylor principle came empirical
applications by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004). These authors argued that (i) violation of the Taylor principle could
help explain the macroeconomic instability of the 1970s, and (ii) a shift in
policy so that the Taylor principle did hold could help explain the subsequent
stability after 1982. Although this work brought multiple equilibria into the
mainstream of applied research on monetary policy, it proceeded under the
assumptionthatthelocallineardynamicsgaveanaccuratepictureofthenature
of equilibrium. These articles also helped to cement the idea that the Taylor
principle characterized “good” monetary policy, because the Taylor principle
would guarantee that inﬂation stayed on target.
Beginning with their 2001a article, Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe
(BSU) showed that when there is a lower bound on nominal interest rates,
the local dynamics can be misleading about the uniqueness of equilibrium
when monetary policy is described by an active Taylor rule. The details of
BSU’s argument will become clear below. The rough intuition is as follows.
Arguments for (local) uniqueness of equilibrium with activeTaylor rules posit
that without shocks, the model has a unique equilibrium at the inﬂation rate
targeted by the interest rate rule. Any other candidate solutions to the model
equations would have the inﬂation rate exploding to plus or minus inﬁnity,
or oscillating explosively. But many of these explosive paths would violate
the lower bound on the nominal interest rate. When that bound is imposed
and the model is studied nonlinearly, it becomes clear that (i) there is a sec-
ond steady-state equilibrium at a lower inﬂation rate, and (ii) there are many
4 Note that Leeper (1991) emphasizes that an active rule guarantees uniqueness only in con-
junction with an assumption about ﬁscal policy, speciﬁcally that ﬁscal policy takes care of balancing
the government budget. We maintain that assumption here. Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe
(2002) discuss the implication of alternative assumptions about ﬁscal policy for multiple equilibria
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non-steady-state equilibria in which the inﬂation rate converges to the low-
inﬂation steady state in the long run.
Initially, while the articles by BSU were widely cited, they did not at-
tract much attention in policy circles. This is somewhat surprising because
the articles were showing that a policy advocated in large part because it was
believed to deliver a unique equilibrium actually delivered multiple equilibria
in some models! Furthermore, a rule that violated the Taylor principle—a
passive rule—would actually be consistent with keeping inﬂation close to its
targeted value, even though there could be multiple equilibria with this prop-
erty. Recently however, the results in BSU have attracted substantial attention
in policy circles. The simultaneous occurrence of low inﬂation and low nom-
inal interest rates in the United States is suggestive of some of the equilibria
identiﬁed by BSU, so it is natural to wonder whether we are experiencing
outcomes associated with those global equilibria. Policymakers care about
this because the global equilibria involve average inﬂation below its intended
level.
2. A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK WITH ONLY NOMINAL
VARIABLES
As a simple framework for communicating some of the key ideas in BSU, this
section works through a two-equation model of the nominal interest rate and
inﬂation. That minimal structure is sufﬁcient to illustrate the potential for the
local and global dynamics to diverge when monetary policy is given by an
active Taylor rule.
Assume that the real interest rate is exogenous and ﬁxed, rt = r, whereas
the nominal interest rate (Rt) and the inﬂation rate (πt) are endogenous.5
Expectations are rational. The model consists of a Fisher equation relating
the short-term nominal interest rate to the short-term real interest rate and
expected inﬂation,
Rt = rEtπt+1, (1)
and a rule specifying how the central bank sets the nominal interest rate—in
this case as a function only of the current inﬂation rate, with an inﬂation target
of π∗:




πt/π∗ γ , (2)
where
R∗ = rπ∗; (3)
5 Throughout the article, interest rates and inﬂation rates are measured in gross terms—that
is, a 4 percent nominal interest rate would be written as Rt = 1.04.322 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
that is, the targeted nominal interest rate is the one that is implied by the
steady-state Fisher equation when inﬂation is equal to its target.
The interest rate rule in (2) may look unfamiliar relative to standard linear
Taylor rules. We use the nonlinear rule because it will simplify the analysis in
the second part of the article.6 Furthermore, the linear approximation to the
rule in (2) around {R∗,π∗} is






πt − π∗ 
, (4)
a simple inﬂation-only Taylor rule in which the coefﬁcient on inﬂation is
γ (R∗ − 1)/π∗, and we assume that γ (R∗ − 1)/π∗ >r>1. The stan-
dard local-linear approach around the point {R∗,π∗} involves combining the
linearized Taylor rule (4) with the linearized Fisher equation (Rt − R∗ =











πt − π∗ 
.
For simplicity, assume perfect foresight—that is, the future is known with
certainty, so that Et (πt+1 − π∗) can be replaced with πt+1 − π∗. Perfect
foresight is clearly an unrealistic assumption, but it is a convenient one for
illustrating the difference between local and global dynamics. With perfect
foresight, we have
 







πt − π∗ 
. (5)
By assumption the coefﬁcient on πt −π∗ is greater than one—the rule obeys
the Taylor principle. Consequently, we can show that there is a unique non-
explosive equilibrium. Constant inﬂation at the targeted steady-state level
(πt = π∗) is clearly an equilibrium because it represents a solution to the
difference equation (5). If inﬂation in period t were equal to any number
other than π∗, inﬂation would have to follow an explosive path going for-
ward because the coefﬁcient on current inﬂation is greater than one. Any such
explosive path would be ruled out as an equilibrium by assumption in the
standard local-linear approach.7
6 Imposing the zero bound on an otherwise linear rule creates a nondifferentiability, making
computation more difﬁcult.
7 Since the model here is itself ad-hoc, we cannot complain about ruling out explosive paths
as equilibria by assumption. Depending on the particular model, explosive paths up or down may
or may not be equilibria—see footnote 3. What is important here is that the ad-hoc model we
wrote down is nonlinear, and the nonlinear analysis yields different conclusions about equilibrium
than the linear analysis.T. Hursey and A. L. Wolman: Monetary Policy and Global Equilibria 323
Figure 1 Steady-State Equilibria
Inflation Rate








Nominal Interest Rate from Taylor Rule
Nominal Interest Rate from Fisher Equation
Steady-State Equilibria
It is obvious that {R∗,π∗} represents a steady-state solution to the Fisher and
Taylor equations ([1] and [2]). Less obviously, there is also a second steady-
state solution with a lower inﬂation rate and a lower nominal interest rate. To
see this, combine the steady-state Fisher and Taylor equations into a single
equation in π:







Figure 1 displays a plot of the right-hand side of (6) (essentially the Taylor
rule)againstthe45-degreeline—whichisalsotheleft-handside, ortheFisher
equation. The two intersections of the right-hand side and left-hand side rep-
resent the two steady-state equilibria. The targeted inﬂation rate is 2 percent,
and the other steady state involves slight deﬂation.
The speciﬁcTaylor rule we chose for this example never allows the nomi-
nal interest rate to hit the zero bound. Alternatively, if we had chosen a typical
linear Taylor rule (Rt = max{R∗ + f (πt − π∗),0}), there would be a kink
inthesteady-stateTaylorcurveatπ = 1/r, andthesecondsteadystatewould
be at π = π∗ − (1/f )R∗. BSU (2001a) and Bullard (2010) contain pictures
oftheanaloguestoFigure1impliedbyseveraldifferentinterestraterulesthat324 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Example of a Non-Steady-State Equilibrium










Inflation in t + 1
Inflation in t
all satisfy the Taylor principle at the targeted steady state, and all imply the
existence of a second steady state with lower inﬂation.
Example of a Non-Steady-State Equilibrium
The fact that there are two steady-state equilibria suggests that there may also
beequilibriainwhichinﬂationandnominalinterestratesﬂuctuate. Returning
now to the nonlinear model, by combining the Fisher equation (1) and the
interest rate rule (2) and imposing perfect foresight, we have a ﬁrst-order
difference equation for the inﬂation rate:







This is the nonlinear analogue of (5). In contrast to the linearized model, we
can show that there is a continuum of nonexplosive equilibria.8 In Figure 2
we plot the right-hand side of (7): It is an identical curve to the solid line in
8 Note the sensitivity of this result to whether current or (expected) future inﬂation is the
argument in the policy rule. If the policy rule responds to πt+1 instead of πt, then the same two
steady-state equilibria exist; but the system is entirely static and, under perfect foresight, the two
steady-state equilibria are also the only two equilibrium values for inﬂation in any period. TheT. Hursey and A. L. Wolman: Monetary Policy and Global Equilibria 325
Figure 1. The dotted line is the 45-degree line, which is also the left-hand
side of (7). The intersections between the two lines are the steady states and,
starting with any initial inﬂation rate below the targeted steady state, we can
trace an equilibrium path using the solid line and the 45-degree line. For
example, from an initial inﬂation rate of 1.014, the vertical solid lines with
arrowspointingdownindicatethesuccessivevaluesofinﬂationgoingforward.
Generalizing from this example, the ﬁgure shows that all perfect foresight
equilibria except for the targeted steady state converge to the nontargeted
steady state. In contrast, the conventional local linear approach applied to the
targetedsteadystatewouldconcludethatthetargetedsteadystatewastheonly
equilibrium—other solutions are locally explosive and would be ruled out by
assumption. Figure 2 conveys the essence of the literature that began with
BSU (2001a): Local analysis suggests a unique equilibrium, whereas global
analysis reveals that many solutions ruled out as explosive instead lead to a
second steady-state equilibrium.
Becausethequalitativeresultsinvolvingasecondsteadystateandmultiple
equilibria will carry over into the model with an endogenous real interest
rate and endogenous output, it is interesting to discuss the economics behind
these results. In a neighborhood of the targeted steady state, the interest rate
rule responds to an upward (downward) deviation of inﬂation from target
by moving the interest rate upward (downward) more than proportionally.
This sets off a locally explosive chain: The Fisher equation (1) dictates that
an increase in the current nominal interest rate must correspond to a higher
future inﬂation rate, which then is met with a further increase in next period’s
interest rate, etc. One notable aspect of this process is that there is no sense
in which a higher nominal interest rate represents “tighter” monetary policy.
Themodelhasonlynominalvariables, andahighernominalinterestratemust
correspond to higher expected inﬂation. In contrast, the Taylor principle is
oftenthoughtofasensuringthatanincreaseininﬂationismetwithamonetary
tightening, as represented by a higher nominal interest rate. In models with
realeffectsofmonetarypolicy—suchastheonediscussedbelow—anincrease
in the nominal interest rate does not have to correspond to higher expected
inﬂation. However, we have learned from the two-equation model that this
associationofhigherinterestrateswithtightmonetarypolicyisnotaninherent
ingredient in the local uniqueness and global multiplicity associated with the
Taylor principle.9
“economy” can bounce arbitrarily between those two values in a deterministic way. There may
also be rational expectations equilibria with stochastic ﬂuctuations.
9 See Cochrane (2011) for a similar argument.326 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
3. A MODEL WITH REAL VARIABLESAND MONETARY
NONNEUTRALITY
The model above taught us that the Fisher equation together with aTaylor rule
that responds strongly to inﬂation can lead to multiple steady states and other
equilibria because of the lower bound on nominal interest rates. However,
the only endogenous variables in that model are nominal variables. One of
the simplest ways to endogenize real variables and introduce real effects of
monetary policy is with a version of the Rotemberg (1982) model, which has
quadratic costs of nominal price adjustment. In this model, there is a repre-
sentative household that takes all prices and aggregate quantities as given, and
chooses how much to consume and how much to work. There is a contin-
uum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms that face convex costs of adjusting
their nominal prices, and there is a monetary authority that sets the short-term
nominal interest rate according to a time-invariant feedback rule.
The representative household has preferences over consumption (ct) and
(disutility of) labor (ht) given by
∞  
t=0
βt (ln(ct) − χht). (8)
There is a competitive labor market in which the real wage is wt per unit of
time. The consumption good is a composite of a continuum of differentiated
products(ct (z)),eachofwhichareproducedundermonopolisticcompetition:
ct =








Households own the ﬁrms. An individual household’s budget constraint is
ct + R−1
t Bt/Pt = wtht + Bt−1/Pt +  t/Pt, (10)
where  t represents nominal dividends from ﬁrms, Pt is the price of the com-
posite good, and Bt is the quantity of one-period nominal discount bonds. As
above, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate. The household’s intratemporal
ﬁrst-orderconditionsrepresentingoptimalchoiceoflaborinputandconsump-
tion are given by
λtwt = χ, (11)
and
λt = 1/ct, (12)
and the intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition representing optimal choice of




t = β ·
λt+1
Pt+1
. (13)T. Hursey and A. L. Wolman: Monetary Policy and Global Equilibria 327
In these equations, the variable λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget
constraint for period t—it can also be thought of as the marginal utility of
an additional unit of consumption at time t. Note that the intertemporal ﬁrst-
order condition (13) corresponds to the Fisher equation from the ﬁrst model,








in terms of ﬁnal goods of changing the nominal










Because goods are produced both for consumption and for accomplishing
price adjustment, the market-clearing condition is





where yt denotes total output of the composite good, πt denotes the gross
inﬂationrate(Pt/Pt−1),andwehaveimposedsymmetryacrossﬁrms,meaning
that all ﬁrms choose the same price.
Anindividualﬁrmchoosesitspriceeachperiodtomaximizetheexpected
presentvalueofproﬁts,whereproﬁtsinanysingleperiodaregivenbyrevenue
minus costs of production minus costs of price adjustment. The demand
curvefacingeachﬁrmisyt (z) = (Pt (z)/Pt)
−ε yt, sotheproﬁtmaximization































The ﬁrst term in the square brackets is the real revenue a ﬁrm earns charging
a price Pt+j (z) in period t +j; it sells
 
Pt+j (z)/Pt+j
 −ε yt+j units of goods
for relative price Pt+j (z)/Pt+j. The second term in the square brackets (in
the second line of the expression) is the real costs the ﬁrm incurs in period
t + j, number of goods sold multiplied by average cost, which is equal to
marginal cost and to the real wage because labor productivity is constant and
equal to one. Finally, the third term in the square brackets is the real cost of
adjusting the nominal price from Pt+j−1 (z) to Pt+j (z). Note that the price
chosen in any period shows up only in two periods of the inﬁnite sum. Thus,










































































If we multiply both sides by Pt and impose symmetry—that is, assume that
all ﬁrms choose the same price in any given period, the expression simpliﬁes
to
(1 − ε)yt + εwtyt





θπt+1 (πt+1 − 1) = 0.
Using the goods market clearing condition (15) and the household’s opti-
mality conditions, the previous equation simpliﬁes to a form that we will refer
to as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve:10

















where πt is the gross inﬂation rate.
Finally, monetary policy is given by a nominal interest rate rule similar
to what was used in the two-equation model, with the one difference that the
interestraterespondstoexpectedfutureinﬂationinsteadoftocurrentinﬂation:




πt+1/π∗ γ . (17)
Recall that in the two-equation model, using a policy rule identical to (17)
wouldrenderthemodelentirelystatic,whereastherulethatrespondstocurrent
inﬂation introduces dynamics. In the current model, optimal pricing already
introduces dynamics, so we choose to use the future-inﬂation version of the
policy rule.11 Combining the policy rule with the household’s intertemporal
10 We should note that the term “New Keynesian Phillips Curve” typically refers to the lin-
earized version of (16).
11 Note that with current inﬂation in the policy rule, the steady states do not change and
it would be possible to study dynamic equilibria in the same way we do here—tentative resultsT. Hursey and A. L. Wolman: Monetary Policy and Global Equilibria 329
ﬁrst-order condition (13), using the deﬁnition of the inﬂation rate to eliminate
the price level, and using the household’s intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition













The model has now been reduced to two nonlinear difference equations (16)
and (18) in the variables ct,πt,c t+1, and πt+1.
4. LOCAL DYNAMICSAROUND STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIA
As with the ad-hoc model in Section 2, there are two steady-state equilibria.
That there are two steady-state equilibrium inﬂation rates is immediately ap-
parent from (18)—in a steady state it is identical to (6). One of the steady
states has inﬂation equal to the targeted inﬂation rate π∗, and the other steady
state has a lower inﬂation rate.12 The steady-state levels of consumption are
determined by (16).
To study dynamic equilibria, we follow the same steps as in the two-
equation model, beginning with the linearized model and then moving on to













F (ct,c t+1,πt,πt+1) =
























suggest that qualitatively similar results apply with current inﬂation in the policy rule. Our approach
in this article is positive rather than normative. For a policymaker choosing a rule, whether multiple
equilibria arise would be one important consideration in that choice.
12 This statement relies again on γ being sufﬁciently large. In contrast, for low enough γ
such that R   
π∗ 
< 1, the second steady state will involve inﬂation higher than π∗.330 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly







Linearizing around the steady state with the targeted inﬂation rate (denoted
[c∗,π∗]) yields
 
F2 (c∗,c ∗,π∗,π∗) F4 (c∗,c ∗,π∗,π∗)








F1 (c∗,c ∗,π∗,π∗) F3 (c∗,c ∗,π∗,π∗)






where Hj (s) denotes the jth partial derivative of the generic function H (),
evaluated at s.
The existence and uniqueness of a nonexplosive equilibrium in the lin-
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Neither ct nor πt are predetermined variables, so the condition for a unique
nonexplosive equilibrium is that both eigenvalues of J be less than one in
absolute value. Because we are not able to provide a general proof of the
parameter conditions under which equilibrium exists and is unique, we turn to
anumericalexample,whichwewillstaywithfortherestofthearticle.13 Table
1 contains the parameters for that example; they are chosen to be consistent
with a 2 percent annual inﬂation target (the model is a quarterly model), a 4
percentrealinterestrate,amarkupof20percent,andacoefﬁcientintheTaylor
ruleof1.33whentheTaylorruleislinearizedaroundthetargetedsteadystate.
In addition, our choice of θ implies that price adjustment costs are less than
2
10 percent of output.
Atthetargetedsteadystate, thelocal(nonexplosive)dynamicsareunique,
in a trivial sense. The Jacobian’s eigenvalues are 0.99771321±0.12791602i,
which means that both eigenvalues have absolute value 1.0059. Local to the
13 If the targeted inﬂation rate were zero (π∗ = 1) then it would be straightforward to
characterize uniqueness conditions analytically—this is the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve.
With a nonzero inﬂation target there are price-adjustment costs incurred in steady state, and the
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targetedsteadystate, thefactthatbotheigenvalueshaveabsolutevaluegreater
than one and are imaginary means that any solution to the difference equation
system (19) other than the steady state itself oscillates explosively. In the
linearized model the local dynamics are the global dynamics, so the only
nonexplosive solution is the targeted steady state itself.
Suppose instead that we linearize around the low-inﬂation steady state.
There the Jacobian’s eigenvalues are 1.1291231 and 0.89509305. This eigen-
value conﬁguration, with one explosive root and one stable root (less than
one), means that there is a saddlepath: Given an initial value for c (or an
initial value for π), there is a unique initial value for π (or for c) such that the
economy will converge from that point to the steady state with low inﬂation.
If either inﬂation or consumption were predetermined variables, then this sad-
dlepath would describe the unique equilibrium at any point in time. Because
neither variable is predetermined, the saddlepath represents one dimension of
equilibrium indeterminacy at any point in time. That is, any value of c (or π)
is consistent with equilibrium in period t, but as was stated above, once that
value of c (or π) has been selected, the associated value of π (or c) is pinned
down, as is the entire subsequent equilibrium path.14
The conventional linearization approach to studying NNS models, as fol-
lowed, forexample, byKingandWolman(1996), involvesimplicitlyignoring
the steady state with low inﬂation. In that approach it is presumed that the
onlyrelevantsteadystateisthetargetedone. Fromthesamekindofreasoning
used in the discussion following (5), the explosiveness of paths local to the
targeted steady state means there is a unique nonexplosive equilibrium, the
steady state itself. One can then proceed to study the properties of the model
when subjected to shocks, for example to productivity or monetary policy.
However, the fact that there are two steady states suggests that it may be re-
vealing to investigate the global dynamics. Furthermore, if one extrapolates
the local dynamics around the two steady states, it leads to the conjecture that
paths that explode locally from the targeted steady state may in fact end up as
stable paths converging at the low-inﬂation steady state. This is indeed what
we will ﬁnd in studying the global dynamics.
5. GLOBAL DYNAMICS
Studying the model’s global dynamics means analyzing the nonlinear equa-
tions ([18] and [16]). We will combine the nonlinear equations with informa-
tion about the local dynamics to trace out the global stable manifold of the
low-inﬂationsteadystate. Theglobalstablemanifoldisthesetofinﬂationand
14 Because we are dealing here with perfect foresight paths, the discussion of period t really
should apply only to an initial period, prior to which the perfect foresight assumption does not
apply. After that initial period the equilibrium outcomes are unique.332 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
consumptioncombinationssuchthatifinﬂationandconsumptionbegininthat
set, there is an equilibrium path that leads in the long run to the low-inﬂation
steady state. While this approach may not yield a comprehensive description
of the perfect foresight equilibria, it will provide a coherent picture of how
the two steady states relate to the dynamic behavior of consumption and inﬂa-
tion.15 Wewillﬁndthatthelocalsaddlepathcanbeunderstoodaspartofapath
(the global stable manifold) that begins arbitrarily close to the targeted steady
state and cycles around that steady state with greater and greater amplitude
before converging monotonically to the low-inﬂation steady state.
From Local to Global
Before plunging into the global dynamics, it may be helpful to take stock of
our knowledge. There are two steady-state equilibria, one with the targeted
inﬂation rate (π∗) and one with a lower inﬂation rate (πl). The levels of
consumptioninthetwosteadystatesarec∗ andcl. Localtothetargetedsteady
state, alldynamicpathsoscillateexplosively. Localtothelowinﬂationsteady
state many paths explode and one path converges to that steady state. To go
further,wewillcombinetheforwarddynamicslocaltothelowinﬂationsteady
state with the nonlinear backward dynamics. This approach will allow us to
compute the global stable manifold of the low-inﬂation steady state. Since all
paths diverge around the targeted steady state, no analogous approach can be
applied there.
As described above, the local dynamics around {cl,πl} involve a unique
pathin{c,π}spacethatconvergestothesteadystate. Ifwebeginwithapoint
on that path, very close to the low-inﬂation steady state, and then iterate the
nonlinear system backward, we can trace out the global dynamics associated
withthesaddlepath—theglobalstablemanifold. Wenowdescribethisprocess
algorithmically.
1. To ﬁnd a point on the local saddlepath of the low-inﬂation steady state,
follow the approach described in Blanchard and Kahn (1980). First,
decompose the Jacobian matrix J into its Jordan form: J = P P−1,
where   is a diagonal 2 × 2 matrix whose diagonal elements are the
eigenvalues of J, and where P i sa2× 2 matrix whose columns are
the eigenvectors of J. Next, rewrite the system in terms of canonical
variables x1,t and x2,t, which are linear combinations of ct and πt :  
x1,t x2,t














15 While we have not proved that the global stable manifold contains all perfect foresight
equilibria, we conjecture this to be the case.T. Hursey and A. L. Wolman: Monetary Policy and Global Equilibria 333
Note that at the steady state cl,πl,w eh a v ex1,l = x2,l = 0. Recall that
one of the roots (λ1,λ 2) is greater than one. Without loss of generality,
assume that λ1 > 1. Any point on the local saddlepath must have
x1,t = 0, because x1,t+j = λ1x1,t+j−1, and if x1,t  = 0 then x1,t+j could
not approach 0 as j →∞ . Select one such point within an ε ball of
the low-inﬂation steady state and call that point {cT,πT}. Set t = T.
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presence of two solutions is rooted in the properties of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-
maximizationproblem—whilethereisauniqueproﬁt-maximizingprice,
there are multiple solutions to the ﬁrst-order condition. Only the
positive root of the quadratic is consistent with the ﬁrm maximizing
proﬁts—the negative root typically implies a negative gross inﬂation
rate, which would imply a negative price level.
4. Set t = t − 1, return to step 2.
Figure 3 describes the results of iterating backward for 450 periods in
steps 2 through 4. The ﬁgure is in c,π space. It plots the two steady states
and the global stable manifold of the low-inﬂation steady state, constructed as
just described. The arrows represent forward movement in time, as opposed
to the backward movement that characterizes the algorithm. The algorithm
starts at a point close to the low-inﬂation steady state and goes backward in
time. The ﬁgure shows that the only path that converges to a steady-state
equilibrium initially involves spirals around the targeted steady state and ends
with monotonic convergence to the low-inﬂation steady state. The ﬁgure
provides us with a uniﬁed understanding of the local results around the two
steady states. From the local dynamics we learn that all paths local to the
targeted steady state oscillate explosively. From Figure 3, we see that one of
those paths is not globally explosive, instead converging at the low-inﬂation
steady state. This path is what we refer to as the global stable manifold.334 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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6. CONCLUSION
Since late 2008, both inﬂation and nominal interest rates have been extremely
lowintheUnitedStates. Thesefactshavefocusedattentiononideasmotivated
by the theory in BSU (2001a, 2001b, 2002): An active Taylor rule, together
with a moderate inﬂation target, could have the unintended consequence of
leading the economy to undesirably low inﬂation with a near-zero nominal
interest rate. The article by St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank President James
Bullard (2010) represents the leading example of this attention.
Theaimofthisarticlewastoprovideanaccessibleintroductiontotheideas
in BSU (2001a). Much of the literature in this area uses models that are either
setincontinuoustimeorthatassumepricesareﬂexible. Incontrast,themodel
inthisarticleissetindiscretetimeandhasstickyprices. Discretetimereduces
mathematical tractability, but makes it easy to compute speciﬁc solutions; in
addition, the quantitative literature on monetary policy overwhelmingly uses
discrete time models. Sticky prices are also a central element in the applied
monetary policy literature. In adapting BSU’s analysis to a discrete-time
framework with sticky prices, we have seen that the general conclusions of
their work also apply to the speciﬁc example we have analyzed. First, with
an active Taylor rule, the presence of a lower bound on the nominal interestT. Hursey and A. L. Wolman: Monetary Policy and Global Equilibria 335
rate leads to the presence of two steady states, one at the targeted inﬂation
rate and one at a lower inﬂation rate. Second, the targeted steady state, which
is a unique equilibrium according to the conventional local analysis, instead
is the source for a global stable manifold of the low-inﬂation steady-state
equilibrium.
Inclosingwewilloffersomecaveatsregardingusingthekindofanalysisin
this article to interpret current economic outcomes. It is tempting to conclude
fromFigure3thatthelow-inﬂationsteadystateis“morelikely”becauseitdoes
possess a stable manifold while the targeted steady state does not. However,
the model only tells us what equilibria exist, not how likely they are to occur.
It is also tempting to conclude from this work that policy may be unwittingly
leading the economy to the unintended steady state. However, the theoretical
analysis is based on perfect information about the model and the equilibrium
by all agents. It is interesting to think about situations where policymakers
and private decisionmakers do not understand the structure of the economy,
butthatisnotthesituationanalyzedhere. Finally, weshouldstressthatbefore
using this kind of framework for quantitative analysis, it would be desirable
to enrich the model to incorporate capital accumulation. The behavior of the
capital stock plays a key role in interest rate determination, and at this point
it is an open question whether the kind of dynamics described here carry over
to models with capital accumulation.
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